

1 Mark C. Mao, CA Bar No. 236165
 2 Beko Reblitz-Richardson, CA Bar No. 238027
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
 3 44 Montgomery St., 41st Floor
 San Francisco, CA 94104
 4 Tel.: (415) 293-6800
 mmao@bsflp.com
 5 brichardson@bsflp.com

6 James Lee (admitted *pro hac vice*)
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
 7 100 SE 2nd St., 28th Floor
 Miami, FL 33131
 8 Tel.: (305) 539-8400
 9 jlee@bsflp.com

10 Amanda K. Bonn, CA Bar No. 270891
SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
 11 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
 Los Angeles, CA 90067
 12 Tel: (310) 789-3100
 13 Fax: (310) 789-3150
 14 abonn@susmangodfrey.com

15 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

Bill Carmody (admitted *pro hac vice*)
 Shawn J. Rabin (admitted *pro hac vice*)
 Steven M. Shepard (admitted *pro hac vice*)
 Alexander P. Frawley
 (admitted *pro hac vice*)
SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
 1301 Avenue of the Americas,
 32nd Floor
 New York, NY 10019
 Tel.: (212) 336-8330
 bcarmody@susmangodfrey.com
 srabin@susmangodfrey.com
 sshepard@susmangodfrey.com
 afrawley@susmangodfrey.com

John A. Yanchunis (admitted *pro hac vice*)
 Ryan J. McGee (admitted *pro hac vice*)
 Michael F. Ram, CA Bar No. 238027
 Ra O. Amen (admitted *pro hac vice*)
MORGAN & MORGAN
 201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
 Tampa, FL 33602
 Tel.: (813) 223-5505
 jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
 rmcgee@forthepeople.com
 mram@forthepeople.com
 ramen@forthepeople.com

17 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
 18 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

19 ANIBAL RODRIGUEZ, SAL
 CATALDO, JULIAN
 20 SANTIAGO, and SUSAN LYNN
 HARVEY, individually and on behalf of all
 21 others similarly situated,

22 Plaintiffs,

23 vs.

24 GOOGLE LLC,

25 Defendant.
 26

Case No.: 3:20-cv-04688

**PLAINTIFFS' RULE 15(a) MOTION
 FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT
 (R. CIV. P. 15(a))**

The Honorable Richard Seeborg
 Courtroom 3 – 17th Floor
 Date: December 8, 2022
 Time: 1:30 p.m.

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 8, 2022, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Courtroom 3, 17th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, before the Honorable Richard Seeborg, the undersigned Plaintiffs will and hereby do move the Court for an order pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure granting Plaintiffs leave to file their proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, which seeks to revise Plaintiffs' proposed class definitions. This Motion is based upon this Notice and Motion, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Mark C. Mao, other materials in the record, argument of counsel, and such other matters as the Court may consider.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether Plaintiffs should be granted leave to file their proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, which, based on discovery, seeks to clarify the true scope of Google's improper collection, saving, and use of data collected from users who switched off Web & App Activity?

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiffs respectfully request an Order providing that Plaintiffs may file their proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, attached as Exhibit 1 to the concurrently filed Declaration of Mark C. Mao. A redline showing the proposed changes to the Complaint is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Mao Declaration.

Dated: October 28, 2022

BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP

By: /s/ Mark Mao
Mark C. Mao (CA Bar No. 236165)

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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs respectfully seek leave to amend their Complaint—not to add any legal claims, but to instead conform their class definitions to the evidence Google has produced. The core of the case remains the same: Plaintiffs and putative class members are individuals who turned “off” Google’s “Web & App Activity” control (“WAA”). In this Court’s own words, Google “‘set an expectation’ that it would not save plaintiffs’ ‘activity on . . . apps . . . that use Google services’ unless plaintiffs turned WAA ‘on.’” Dkt. 109 at 16 (citations omitted). Google did not live up to its promises, and Plaintiffs now understand the actual scope of Google’s improper collection and saving of data that Google collected from class members’ activity while the class members had switched WAA “off” (their “WAA-off data”).

Discovery has substantiated Plaintiffs’ claims. Google’s employees privately recognize, but do not publicly disclose, that Google’s WAA disclosures are [REDACTED]” (Ex.¹ 3, GOOG-RDGZ-00021160 at -82) and [REDACTED] (Ex. 4, GOOG-RDGZ-00130745 at -46), that WAA [REDACTED] (Ex. 5, GOOG-RDGZ-00015004 at -04) and people [REDACTED] [REDACTED]” (Ex. 3, GOOG-RDGZ-00021160 at -84), and that Google’s promise of control is [REDACTED]” (Ex. 6, GOOG-RDGZ-00020680 at -80).

[REDACTED] Ex. 7, GOOG-RDGZ-00130381 at -81. Another Google employee, evaluating how the WAA control worked, truthfully described WAA as a [REDACTED] Ex. 8, GOOG-RDGZ-00130416 at -601.

Through discovery and Google’s representations in this case, Plaintiffs have been learning just how [REDACTED]. Google’s collection and saving of users’ WAA-off data is not limited to Google Analytics for Firebase; even Google’s counsel claims that some of the documents cited above “discuss[] completely unrelated products and circumstances.” Dkt. 247 at 5 n.3. Google also saves and ultimately profits from WAA-off data collected by way of additional

¹ “Ex.” refers to the exhibits attached to the Declaration of Mark Mao, concurrently filed herewith.

Google [REDACTED] embedded within non-Google apps, as well as [REDACTED]

Despite Google's efforts to obstruct all discovery beyond Google Analytics for Firebase, the documents produced in this case have provided additional clarity on the full scope of Google's WAA-off data collection and of Google's saving and use of that WAA-off data. Based on this further discovery, Plaintiffs now seek to conform the complaint to the true scope of Google's improper collection, saving and use of WAA-off data.

A number of different [REDACTED]—in addition to Google Analytics for Firebase—collect, save, and use WAA-off data. These include (for example) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] See Fourth Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶¶ 59-71.

That is just the tip of the iceberg. Despite Google's steadfast efforts to limit discovery to Google Analytics for Firebase, Plaintiffs have uncovered the enormous base that lies beneath—that the WAA "control" is entirely illusory. In fact, Google saves and uses WAA-off data generated from users' interactions with [REDACTED] as well, including [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. See *id.* ¶¶ 72-77. For example, one Google document describes a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ex. 10, Monsees Tr. 232:1-12. Google's saving of WAA-off [REDACTED] data flies in the face of Google's disclosures to its users, which promise that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] are "save[d]" "[w]hen Web & App Activity is *on*," not off. FAC ¶ 95. Google must be held accountable for its plain disregard of its assurances of privacy.

Even with these proposed amendments to the complaint, this case remains limited to those people who turned off WAA. That includes both those who turned off WAA and those who turned off a subsetting referred to “Supplemental Web & App Activity” or “SWAA.” And the case remains focused on Google’s violation of the same set of disclosures that have been at the heart of this case from the beginning. Consistent with the discovery obtained to date and the additional factual allegations included in this proposed amendment, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their current class definitions as follows, remaining focused on data generated during users’ interactions with non-Google apps.

Class 1 – All individuals who during the Class Period (a) turned off “Web & App Activity,” or supplemental “Web & App Activity” and (b) whose mobile app activity was still transmitted to Google, from (c) a mobile device running the Android operating system (OS), because of [REDACTED], including Firebase SDK [REDACTED] scripts, on a non-Google branded mobile app.

Class 2 – All individuals who during the Class Period (a) turned off “Web & App Activity,” or “supplemental Web & App Activity,” and (b) whose mobile app activity was still transmitted to Google, from (c) a mobile device running a *non*-Android operating system (OS), because of [REDACTED], including Firebase SDK [REDACTED] scripts, on a non-Google branded mobile app.

Plaintiffs also seek leave to add an additional third class, focused on [REDACTED]:

[REDACTED]

With this amendment, Plaintiffs seek to conform their class definitions to what discovery has revealed and to cover the true scope of Google’s illicit collection, saving, and use of users’ WAA-off data. Plaintiffs do not seek to add any new claims. The existing three claims, which have survived three motions to dismiss, apply to the revised class definitions.

Leave to amend Classes 1 and 2 is warranted because Google cannot meet its burden to establish any of the *Foman* factors: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, futility of amendment, and prejudice to the opposing party.” *Meaux v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.*, 2006 WL 8459606, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2006) (citing *Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Plaintiffs have not delayed in seeking this amendment; Plaintiffs are merely seeking to conform the pleadings to

1 the evidence obtained in discovery, including recent depositions. Google also cannot establish that
 2 Plaintiffs seek this amendment in bad faith, nor that amendment will be futile, particularly because
 3 Plaintiffs' theory of the case remains the one this Court already affirmed. And since this
 4 amendment simply conforms the class definition to evidence Google itself provided, there is no
 5 prejudice (the most significant factor). *See Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.*, 316 F.3d 1048,
 6 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs do not seek to extend the case deadlines nor serve new discovery
 7 on the basis of this amendment.

8 This analysis is nearly identical for the new class relating to [REDACTED] (Class 3). The
 9 only difference is that Plaintiffs will need to serve new discovery. Although Plaintiffs now know
 10 that Google *is* improperly saving Plaintiffs' and Class members' WAA-off [REDACTED] data,
 11 discovery to date includes limited information about what specific WAA-off data is saved, where
 12 that data is saved, and how Google uses it. The benefit of such discovery substantially outweighs
 13 any burden. Unless Plaintiffs are permitted to pursue these claims, on behalf of the same users who
 14 turned off WAA, Google's liability would not correspond with the evidence that discovery has
 15 yielded. Relatedly, class members who have been doubly wronged would be denied the
 16 opportunity to pursue the full scope of their claims against Google for Google's use of their WAA-
 17 off data. The amendment is simply guided by "the underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . . to facilitate
 18 decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities." *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d
 19 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). Google should not be rewarded for (until now) concealing the true
 20 scope of its improper saving and use of WAA-off data. Plaintiffs believe that judicial economy
 21 would be best served by pursuing these allegations in this litigation, including because the parties
 22 have already litigated the meaning of Google's WAA disclosures and the parties have conducted
 23 discovery into WAA. But Plaintiffs are open to the Court's guidance regarding whether their
 24 allegations relating to [REDACTED] (Class 3) are better raised in separate litigation.

25 BACKGROUND

26 I. This Court's Denial in Part of Google's First Motion to Dismiss

27 Plaintiffs are Google account holders who sought to exercise control over their data by
 28 using the "control" that Google purports to provide—the Web & App Activity ("WAA") control,

1 which is a switch that users can turn on or off (sometimes referred to as “paused” or “disabled”).
 2 Google uniformly represented to users that WAA “must be on” to “let Google save” “info about
 3 your searches and other activity on Google sites, apps, and services” as well as “info about your
 4 browsing and other activity on . . . apps . . . that use Google services.” FAC ¶ 95. Plaintiffs alleged
 5 in their First Amended Complaint that they understood this uniform Google disclosure to mean
 6 that turning off WAA would prevent Google from collecting, saving, and using data related to
 7 their interactions with non-Google apps that use Google services (e.g., Firebase). First Am. Compl.
 8 ¶¶ 75-76, Dkt. 113. Google moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims, including the CDAFA, intrusion
 9 upon seclusion, and invasion of privacy claims, principally arguing that Plaintiffs consented to
 10 Google’s collection of their WAA-off data. *See* Dkt. 62 at 11-12 (“Because Plaintiffs consented to
 11 the collection of the data that forms the basis of each claim, the Complaint should be dismissed in
 12 its entirety with prejudice.”).

13 This Court rejected Google’s principal defense, holding that “plaintiffs did not consent to
 14 Google collecting their data, through GA for Firebase, with WAA turned ‘off.’” Dkt. 109 at 7.
 15 “Google, through the WAA Materials, set an expectation that it would not save plaintiffs’ ‘activity
 16 on . . . apps . . . that use Google services’ unless plaintiffs turned WAA ‘on.’” *Id.* at 16. The
 17 definition of “Google services” within the Google Privacy Policy “permits the inference that GA
 18 for Firebase is a ‘Google service’—that is, a ‘[p]roduct[] that [is] integrated into third party
 19 apps[.]’” *Id.* at 8. This Court also explained that “[w]here, as here, a company’s public-facing
 20 statements are legitimately confusing, it is not the public’s fault for being confused,” and held that
 21 “Plaintiffs offer a cogent account of why they saw WAA as capable of turning off GA for
 22 Firebase’s collection of their third-party app data.” *Id.* at 10.

23 **II. This Court’s Decisions on Google’s Subsequent Motions to Dismiss and Strike**

24 Plaintiffs then filed their Second Amended Complaint, which added (1) a breach of contract
 25 claim and (2) allegations that Google also impermissibly collects WAA-off data by way of
 26 additional Google services named AdMob and Cloud Messaging. Dkt. 113. The new allegations
 27 regarding AdMob and Cloud Messaging were based in part on internal Google documents that had
 28 been produced in discovery. Dkt. 121 at 23-24 (citing internal Google documents). Google moved

1 to dismiss the breach of contract claim and Plaintiffs' CIPA § 631 claim, and Google moved to
2 strike the allegations about AdMob and Cloud Messaging. Dkt. 115.

3 This Court granted Google's motion to dismiss the contract claim, holding that the WAA
4 Help Page was neither an enforceable standalone contract nor incorporated into the Google Privacy
5 Policy. Dkt. 127 at 6. The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs' CIPA claim, concluding that the SAC
6 did "not allege Google's interception of user communications 'while the same [are] in transit' to
7 third-party apps." *Id.* at 7. But the Court denied Google's motion to strike AdMob and Cloud
8 Messaging from the Complaint, holding that those allegations "were pled." *Id.*

9 Two weeks following the Court's ruling, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint,
10 in which Plaintiffs sought to correct the identified deficiencies in their CIPA claim, and to allege
11 breach of a unilateral contract. Dkt. 131. Google again moved to dismiss those two claims, and the
12 Court granted Google's motion in January 2022. Dkt. 209.

13 **III. Discovery Has Substantiated Plaintiffs' Claims and Revealed that Google's** 14 **Misconduct Extends Beyond Google Analytics for Firebase**

15 Since the Court's January 2022 ruling, Plaintiffs have uncovered additional examples of
16 Google products and services by which Google collects and saves WAA-off data. With this
17 amended complaint, Plaintiffs are not seeking to revive any previously dismissed claim, nor to add
18 any new claims. Instead, with the benefit of additional discovery made possible by this Court's
19 denial of Google's motion to strike, Plaintiffs now seek to conform their class definitions to
20 additional facts uncovered through discovery.

21 **A. *With WAA, Google Knew Users Thought "Off" Meant Off***

22 Google's own employees agree with Plaintiffs (and the Court) that Google's "public-facing
23 statements [about WAA] are legitimately confusing." Dkt. 109 at 10. [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED]
26 [REDACTED]
27 [REDACTED]
28 [REDACTED]

[illegible]

28

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B. Google's Misconduct with WAA-Off Data Extends Far Beyond Firebase

Google has tried to deflect these concerns about Google collecting and saving WAA-off data by suggesting they are irrelevant to Google Analytics for Firebase. For example, according to Google, [REDACTED] concerns addressed "completely unrelated products and circumstances." Dkt. 247 at 5 n.3. Google's argument shows why Plaintiffs' proposed amendment is warranted. The problems with WAA are so pronounced that even Google cannot pinpoint them to any particular Google product or service. Google's improper collection and saving of WAA-off data extends far beyond Google Analytics for Firebase. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Consistent with the concerns and criticisms expressed by Google's own employees, Plaintiffs now seek to amend their Complaint to identify additional Google services and products by which Google impermissibly collects and saves WAA-off data. [REDACTED] The case remains limited to people who turned off WAA, but the amendment will ensure that the class's claims can be fully and fairly addressed in this case.

By way of example, relating to Classes 1 and 2, one additional [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that Google uses to collect and save WAA-off app activity information is

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[REDACTED]

Based on the discovery to date, the proposed amendment also includes Google's collecting and saving WAA-off data [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

26 **Proposed Amendments**

27 With this amendment, Plaintiffs are not seeking to add any additional claims. Rather, for
28 the existing claims (where the Court already denied Google's motion to dismiss), Plaintiffs seek

1 to amend their class definitions to match the scope of Google’s misconduct, as revealed through
 2 Google’s representations and discovery in this case.

3 Plaintiffs seek to amend the class definitions for Class 1 and 2 as follows:

4 Class 1 – All individuals who during the Class Period (a) turned off “Web & App Activity,”
 5 or supplemental “Web & App Activity” and (b) whose mobile app activity was still
 6 transmitted to Google, from (c) a mobile device running the Android operating system
 (OS), because of [REDACTED] including Firebase SDK [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] on a non-Google branded mobile app.

7 Class 2 – All individuals who during the Class Period (a) turned off “Web & App Activity,”
 8 or “supplemental Web & App Activity” and (b) whose mobile app activity was still
 9 transmitted to Google, from (c) a mobile device running a *non*-Android operating system
 (OS), because of [REDACTED] including Firebase SDK [REDACTED]
 10 [REDACTED] on a non-Google branded mobile app.

11 These first two classes remain focused on Google collecting, saving, and using WAA-off
 12 data obtained from users’ interactions with non-Google apps. And these classes remain focused on
 13 the same uniform Google disclosures underlying Plaintiffs’ initial Complaint. Without altering that
 14 focus, the amendments to Classes 1 and 2 accomplish two goals.

15 First, the amendments to Classes 1 and 2 clarify that these classes include users who had
 16 WAA “on” but sWAA “off.” [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED] But the inverse is not true. A user
 18 can elect to turn on WAA but turn off sWAA and/or keep sWAA off. FAC ¶ 84. Such a user would
 19 be providing consent for Google to “save [their] activity on Google sites and apps” but would not
 20 consent to Google collecting and saving their “activity from . . . apps . . . that use Google services,”
 21 i.e., third-party apps. FAC ¶ 95.

22 Second, consistent with the Second Amended Complaint, which added allegations about
 23 AdMob and Cloud Messaging (*see supra* Background § B), the other alteration to Classes 1 and 2
 24 clarifies that Google’s improper collection of WAA-off data is not limited to Firebase SDK.
 25 Google also collects and saves WAA-off data about users’ interactions with non-Google apps
 26 using additional Google services, including without limitation [REDACTED]

27 [REDACTED] *See supra* Background § C. The proposed amendment contains detailed
 28

1 allegations regarding examples of such additional Google services, relying on evidence produced
2 in discovery. FAC ¶¶ 59-71.

3 Plaintiffs also seek leave to add an additional class, focused on [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED]
7 This Class 3 is limited to those people who turned WAA off, and the claims are based on
8 the same uniform WAA disclosures which this Court interpreted in its initial motion to dismiss
9 ruling: “Google, through the WAA Materials, set an expectation that it would not save plaintiffs’
10 ‘activity on . . . apps . . . that use Google services’ unless plaintiffs turned WAA ‘on.’” Dkt. 109
11 at 16 (ellipsis in original). [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED] Plaintiffs have learned through
13 discovery that Google saves information about WAA-off users’ [REDACTED]
14 and Plaintiffs properly seek to conform the Complaint to that evidence.

15 ARGUMENT

16 I. Legal Standard

17 Under this case’s Management Scheduling Order, “any amendment of the pleadings shall
18 be governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Dkt. 59 at 1. Under Rule 15,
19 “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
20 “The Supreme Court has stated that ‘this mandate is to be heeded.’” *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122,
21 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting *Foman*, 371 U.S. at 182). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has
22 “repeatedly stressed that the court must remain guided by the ‘underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . .
23 to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.’” *Id.* at 1127
24 (alteration in original). “In short, the policy permitting amendment is to be applied with ‘extreme
25 liberality.’” *Gasperin v. Furniture & Mattress Superstore*, 2009 WL 10710497, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
26 Oct. 5, 2009) (Seeborg, J.) (quoting *Eminence Capital*, 316 F.3d at 1051).

1 “The Supreme Court has identified four factors relevant to whether a motion for leave to
 2 amend should be denied: undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, futility of amendment, and
 3 prejudice to the opposing party.” *Meaux v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.*, 2006 WL 8459606, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
 4 July 17, 2006) (citing *Foman*, 371 U.S. at 182). “As this circuit and others have held, it is the
 5 consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” *Eminence*
 6 *Capital*, 316 F.3d at 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing *DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton*, 833 F.2d 183,
 7 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining *Foman*
 8 factors, there exists a *presumption* under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” *Id.*
 9 (emphasis in original). As “[t]he non-moving party[, Google] bears the burden of demonstrating
 10 why leave to amend should not be granted.” *Clayborne v. Chevron Corp.*, 2020 WL 11563087, at
 11 *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2020) (citing *Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose*, 893 F.2d 1074,
 12 1079 (9th Cir. 1990)). Google cannot carry its burden with respect to any of the three classes.

13 **II. All Four *Foman* Factors Favor Granting Leave to Amend Classes 1 and 2, Relating** 14 **to Non-Google Apps.**

15 Start with Classes 1 and 2. Google cannot meet its burden as to any of the *Foman* factors,
 16 particularly because Plaintiffs are not seeking to serve new discovery and because the crux of the
 17 case remains Google’s collection, saving, and use of WAA-off data, focused on the same uniform
 18 Google disclosures.

19 **A. Prejudice**

20 Leave to amend should be granted because the prejudice factor “carries the greatest
 21 weight,” and Google cannot demonstrate any prejudice.

22 “[T]o overcome Rule 15(a)’s liberal policy with respect to the amendment of pleadings a
 23 showing of prejudice must be substantial. Neither delay resulting from the proposed amendment
 24 nor the prospect of additional discovery needed by the non-moving party in itself constitutes a
 25 sufficient showing of prejudice.” *Oracle Am., Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Enter. Co.*, 2017 WL
 26 3149297, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) (quoting *Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp.*, 763 F.
 27 Supp. 2d 1128, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2010)).
 28

Courts routinely conclude there is no substantial prejudice and that leave to amend is warranted where a party merely seeks to conform the complaint to evidence revealed in discovery. “[T]here is nothing inherently improper about amending class definitions in light of discovery issues,” which is all that Plaintiffs seek to accomplish here. *Risher v. Adecco Inc.*, 2021 WL 9182421, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2021) (granting motion for leave to file fourth amended complaint, which included revised class definitions); *Brown v. Google LLC*, 2022 WL 2289057, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2022) (granting plaintiffs’ motion to amend complaint “to change their class definitions to cover additional Google products and services” based on evidence produced in discovery); *Oracle Am., Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Enter. Co.*, 2017 WL 3149297, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) (granting motion for leave to amend complaint where the plaintiff sought to “clarify[] the pleadings based on what it has learned in discovery”).

Moreover, there is no prejudice when “[d]iscovery should not be substantially impacted.” *Aguilar v. Boulder Brands, Inc.*, 2014 WL 4352169, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014). Here, Plaintiffs have already served a small handful of targeted written discovery requests relating to the additional Google services for third-party apps named in the proposed amended complaint, all of which fit within Plaintiffs’ existing allotment of discovery requests. Mao Decl. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs’ latest sets of written discovery requests are their last set relating to Google’s collection of WAA-off data from third-party apps. Mao Decl. ¶ 36. And Plaintiffs have also already sought dates for all of their selected depositions relating to WAA-off data collected from third-party apps. Mao Decl. ¶ 37.

Brand new discovery is unnecessary for Classes 1 and 2 because, as before, “the focus remains on Defendant’s [collection, saving, and use of WAA-off third-party app-activity information] and their . . . representations” regarding WAA. *Aguilar*, 2014 WL 4352169, at *5. Plaintiffs are asserting the same legal claims, focused on WAA, and the amendment “will therefore not require voluminous discovery and will have little impact on the length of the judicial proceedings since no trial date had been set and motion practice is still ongoing.” *Nangle v. Penske Logistics, LLC*, 2016 WL 9503736, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 20, 2016) (granting leave to amend); *see also Unicolors, Inc. v. Kohl’s, Inc.*, 2016 WL 9211658, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016) (granting

1 leave to amend because the proposed amendment “will not result in significant additional
2 discovery, nor would it affect the scheduled trial date”).

3 Google will not suffer any prejudice from defending against the newly added facts
4 regarding Classes 1 and 2. The revised class definitions are based on representations by Google
5 and documents Google produced to Plaintiffs *in this case*, which means Google should not be
6 surprised by these additional products and services. Google correctly chose to produce those
7 documents, deeming them within the scope of Plaintiffs’ claims. Moreover, “[i]t is currently
8 unclear what additional discovery [Google] might need, [particularly] given that any evidence to
9 refute the [new allegations] is presumably within [Google’s] control. And even if some limited
10 discovery were necessary, the mere need for additional discovery, by itself, does not constitute
11 sufficient prejudice under Rule 15 to withhold leave to amend.” *Synchronoss Techs., Inc. v.*
12 *Dropbox Inc.*, 2019 WL 95927, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2019) (granting motion to amend after
13 close of fact discovery). Furthermore, under the current schedule, opening expert reports are not
14 due until January 20, 2023, with rebuttal reports due on May 1, 2023—leaving Google plenty of
15 time to conduct additional investigations (if any is warranted) in advance of those deadlines. Dkt.
16 245 at 2. And while seemingly unnecessary, Plaintiffs have informed Google that, if Google has
17 any questions about the amendment as it relates to the named plaintiffs, it is free to serve discovery.
18 Mao Decl. ¶ 38.

19 To be clear, Plaintiffs have sought a limited extension of the fact discovery cutoff because
20 of certain outstanding discovery disputes (Dkt. 255), but that request is necessary regardless of the
21 outcome of this motion. For example, since early spring, Plaintiffs have sought to conduct testing
22 to determine how WAA and sWAA affect how Google collects, saves, and uses app-activity data.
23 Mao Decl. ¶ 39. To do so, Plaintiffs have sought information about the logs in which Google stores
24 this WAA-off data (including sWAA-off). To date, Google has provided Plaintiffs with very little
25 information, identifying only four logs while withholding thousands more. For example, Google
26 continues to withhold logs that contain “fields” or “bits” dedicated to indicating whether the data
27 was generated while WAA was “off.” Dkt. 250 (joint letter brief). Plaintiffs served written requests
28 aimed at discovering this information in May; yet it took Google until September to complete even

1 a preliminary investigation, and then Google refused to provide the information it found to
2 Plaintiffs, resulting in Plaintiffs' October 17 motion to compel (Dkt. 250). Mao Decl. ¶¶ 39-41;
3 *see also* Dkt. 250 at 1. The outcome of that motion to compel will inform Plaintiffs' data testing
4 proposal to Google. And regardless of the outcome of that motion to compel and this motion for
5 leave to amend, Google's delay has necessitated more time to complete the data production
6 process.

7 Finally, that this amendment might increase Google's liability—by incorporating
8 additional Google services—provides no basis to deny leave. “A Rule 15(a) amendment also is
9 appropriate for increasing the amount of damages sought, or for electing a different remedy than
10 the one originally requested.” 6 Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1474 (3d
11 ed. 2011) (cited with approval in *Malaney v. UAL Corp.*, 2011 WL 13153253, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
12 Oct. 24, 2011) (Seeborg, J.)).

13 *McCabe v. Six Continents Hotels, Inc.*, 2013 WL 12306494 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2013), is
14 instructive. In *McCabe*, the plaintiffs initially alleged that the “defendant unlawfully recorded,
15 without consent or notice, calls to toll-free telephone numbers through which callers made
16 reservations for Holiday Inn Hotels.” *Id.* at *1. During discovery, “plaintiffs came to learn that
17 toll-free reservation numbers associated with Six Continents Hotels' other hotel brands likely were
18 routed to the same call centers as the numbers identified in the complaint.” *Id.* Plaintiffs therefore
19 sought leave to amend to “add allegations regarding the additional hotel brands.” *Id.* at *2. The
20 court granted leave, reasoning: “While the proposed amended complaint would cover a larger
21 number of telephone numbers and hotel brands, it would be based on the same alleged unlawful
22 practice—the unauthorized recording of telephone conversations.” *Id.*

23 Here, as in *McCabe*, to the extent the amendment “would cover a larger [amount] of
24 [WAA-off data that Google collects and saves],” leave is warranted because claims asserted on
25 behalf of Classes 1 and 2 are still “based on the same alleged unlawful practice—the unauthorized”
26 collection and saving (and subsequent use) of WAA-off data generated during users' interactions
27 with third-party apps. *Id.* This “proposed amendment does not raise a new legal or factual theory
28 that would alter the nature of the action.” *Id.* And “even if it were the case that [Plaintiffs are] now

1 attempting to ‘change the narrative,’ Rule 15 exists for the very purpose of allowing such changes
2 in the interest of reaching a proper decision on the merits.’” *Pinterest, Inc. v. Pintrips, Inc.*, 2014
3 WL 12611300, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2014) (Seeborg, J.).

4 Plaintiffs properly seek to amend their class definitions as they begin to prepare their
5 motion for class certification. To deny leave in these circumstances would lead to a final judgment
6 on “technicalities” rather than the merits—thereby flouting the “underlying purpose of Rule 15.”
7 *Lopez*, 203 F.3d at 1127.

8 **B. Undue Delay**

9 Nor can Google establish that Plaintiffs have delayed in seeking this amendment, much
10 less unduly delayed. Plaintiffs filed their last complaint on September 1, 2021 (Dkt. 131), before
11 any meaningful discovery had taken place. Google had at that point only designated three
12 document custodians, and the parties had not yet concluded their negotiations nor motion practice
13 on search terms for those three custodians. Mao Decl. ¶ 42. The parties ultimately filed a joint
14 letter brief regarding their search terms dispute for the first five custodians (the initial three, plus
15 one each for AdMob and Cloud Messaging) on January 7, 2022 (Dkt. 201), which resulted in
16 Google being ordered to review an additional 135,000 documents for those custodians (Dkt. 213).
17 Only on July 28, 2022, did Google represent that its productions for those custodians were
18 substantially complete. And following Plaintiffs’ successful motion to compel (Dkt. 184), Google
19 has produced documents for nineteen additional custodians. Again, only at the end of July 2022
20 did Google represent that those productions were substantially complete. Dkt. 245. In short, the
21 scope of discovery has significantly changed since Plaintiffs filed their prior Complaint over a year
22 ago, and even in the last few months.

23 To the extent there has been “undue delay” in this case, that delay is entirely of Google’s
24 making. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel document productions for the nineteen
25 additional custodians on December 1, 2021, and it resolved the parties’ final disputes over search
26 terms for those custodians on May 9, 2021. Dkts. 184, 238. But somehow, Google did not produce
27 a single unique document from the files of those nineteen additional custodians until July 28, 2022.
28 Mao Decl. ¶ 43. Google’s delay meant that Plaintiffs could not begin depositions until the fall,

1 which prevented Plaintiffs from earlier receiving and piecing together the discovery that forms the
2 basis of this proposed amendment.

3 Plaintiffs' prior attempts to amend their Complaint should not foreclose this amendment.
4 Unlike with Plaintiffs' Second and Third Amended Complaints, this proposed amendment does
5 not seek to any new claims, nor revive any old ones. Plaintiffs are solely seeking to conform their
6 proposed class definitions to the evidence that has been provided in discovery.

7 Over a year ago, when Plaintiffs filed their prior Complaint, the Court had only two weeks
8 earlier denied Google's motion to strike AdMob from the Complaint. Dkt. 127 at 3. Google sought
9 to strike AdMob so that it would not have to provide any discovery about AdMob, arguing that
10 Plaintiffs should not be permitted to "expand discovery beyond its proper scope." Dkt. 122 at 1.
11 This Court denied that motion, and in doing so clarified that Plaintiffs' AdMob allegations
12 "expands the scope of discovery." Dkt. 127 at 7-8.

13 Discovery into AdMob has clarified that, through additional Google services ([REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] Google also improperly collects and saves WAA-off data. Notably, in seeking to strike
15 AdMob from the Complaint, Google did not inform the Court that Google had by then developed

16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED] Consistent with Plaintiffs' Second Amended
21 Complaint, and this Court's denial of Google's motion to strike AdMob from the Complaint,
22 Plaintiffs now seek to make clear that AdMob and [REDACTED] are within the scope of the class
23 definitions.

24 Finally, even if Plaintiffs have delayed in seeking this amendment (and they have not),
25 "delay, by itself, is insufficient to justify denial of leave to amend," *Aguilar*, 2014 WL 4352169,
26 at *1 (quoting *DCD Programs, LTD v. Leighton*, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)), particularly
27 when the amendment is triggered by information learned through discovery. "The volume and
28 complexity of discovery in a case is an acceptable reason for delayed amendment." *Bowen v.*

1 *Target Corp.*, 2019 WL 9240985, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2019). The lack of any prejudice to
 2 Google far outweighs any conceivable delay.

3 *Crawford v. Uber Techs., Inc.*, 2021 WL 4846893 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2021) (Seeborg, J.)
 4 is instructive. In that case, the defendant (Uber) opposed the plaintiffs' motion to amend their
 5 complaint on the ground that "Plaintiffs have previously amended their complaints." *Id.* at *3. This
 6 Court rejected that argument, reasoning that although the prior amendments "may incline in Uber's
 7 favor," that is "outweighed when considering the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
 8 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 'effectively abolish[ed] the restrictive theory' of the prior
 9 pleadings doctrine." *Id.* (quoting *Johnson v. Cty. of Shelby, Miss.*, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014)). The
 10 Court ruled that "allowing leave to amend is in the interest of justice," and that same outcome is
 11 also warranted here, where Plaintiffs are merely seeking to conform the pleadings to discovery and
 12 where the defendant will suffer "relatively little prejudice" (if any at all). *Id.*

13 **C. Bad Faith**

14 Plaintiffs do not seek to amend in bad faith. "Bad faith has been construed by the Ninth
 15 Circuit as an amendment sought with wrongful motive or a plaintiff merely . . . seeking to prolong
 16 the litigation by adding new but baseless legal theories.'" *Bowen*, 2019 WL 9240985, at *5
 17 (quoting *Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc.*, 170 F.3d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1999)). To the contrary,
 18 Plaintiffs' amendment "can be fairly characterized as a clarification of the allegations." *Aguilar*,
 19 2014 WL 4352169, at *4. Plaintiffs are simply clarifying that the class definitions should not be
 20 limited to Firebase, particularly because discovery has confirmed that other Google products,
 21 besides Firebase, collect, save and use WAA-off data.

22 This Court has previously rejected an accusation by Google that Plaintiffs are litigating in
 23 bad faith. *See* Dkt. 209 at 7 ("Plaintiffs take umbrage with Google's casual accusations of 'bad-
 24 faith' litigation. Such contentions should not be made lightly or casually interjected. Moreover,
 25 the record does not reflect such bad-faith litigation tactics. This area of law is complicated. . . .
 26 While Plaintiffs' CIPA claims lack factual support, they do not evidence some kind of improper
 27 litigation conduct."). Insofar as Google tries to revive its baseless bad-faith accusations, the same
 28 outcome is warranted here.

1 **D. Futility**

2 Given the Court’s prior rulings and evidence produced, the amendments are well-founded
 3 and in no way futile. Regardless, any “futility” arguments raised by Google should be dealt with
 4 by way of a Rule 12 motion. “The sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ pleadings has not yet been tested
 5 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and it would be premature to deny plaintiffs’
 6 request for leave to amend as futile on the basis of a full dismissal analysis without an appropriate
 7 motion and full briefing by the parties.” *Malaney v. UAL Corp.*, 2011 WL 13153253, at *2 (N.D.
 8 Cal. Oct. 24, 2011) (Seeborg, J.).

9 Plaintiffs are confident they would prevail on any motion to dismiss. The amendments to
 10 Class 1 and Class 2 rely on the exact same language this Court considered when it denied Google’s
 11 motion to dismiss the current claims (CDAFA, intrusion upon seclusion, and invasion of privacy).
 12 “Google, through the WAA Materials, ‘set an expectation’ that it would not save plaintiffs’
 13 ‘activity on . . . apps . . . that use Google services’ unless plaintiffs turned WAA ‘on.’” Dkt. 109
 14 at 16 (citing WAA Help Page). And the definition of “Google services” within the Google Privacy
 15 Policy “permits the inference that GA for Firebase is a ‘Google service’—that is, a ‘[p]roduct[]
 16 that [is] integrated into third party apps.’” *Id.* at 8. The expansion to Classes 1 and 2 simply clarifies
 17 additional Google products that are integrated into third-party apps, including [REDACTED]
 18 [REDACTED] Google, through the WAA Help Page, “set an expectation that
 19 it would not save plaintiffs’ ‘activity on . . . apps . . . that use [these new services] unless plaintiffs
 20 turned WAA ‘on.’” Dkt. 109 at 16. That prior holding applies to the proposed expansion to
 21 Classes 1 and 2.

22 This Court’s subsequent denial of Google’s motion to strike also shows why this motion
 23 to amend should be granted (and why any motion to dismiss or strike should be denied). In this
 24 Court’s own words, the SAC “name[d] two new Google services—AdMob and Cloud Messaging
 25 for Firebase (‘Cloud Messaging’)—as vehicles for Google’s supposed misconduct.” Dkt. 127 at 3.
 26 Plaintiffs’ current motion likewise (and solely) seeks to clarify AdMob’s role and to specify
 27 additional Google products as vehicles for Google’s misconduct, while remaining focused on the
 28 same misleading WAA disclosures underlying Plaintiffs’ case.

* * *

In sum, all four *Foman* factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs' motion to amend Classes 1 and 2. Substantial discovery is not necessary to show that Google collects, saves, and uses WAA-off, third-party app data [REDACTED] other than the Firebase SDK. Plaintiffs have not delayed in seeking this amendment, which is based largely on Google's representations and discovery. Plaintiffs seek this amendment in good faith, and cannot imagine a cogent argument to the contrary. These amendments could not possibly be futile because they clarify what Plaintiffs and the Court have always understood to be part of this case. And Plaintiffs' amendments are based on the very same disclosures and conduct that is already at issue in this case regarding Google's collection of WAA-off data using Firebase, which even Google concedes is within the case as it stands.

III. The *Foman* Factors Also Favor Granting Leave to Add Class 3, Relating to [REDACTED]

Nearly the same analysis applies with respect to Plaintiffs' request to add Class 3. Class 3 relates to Google's violation of its promise not to save [REDACTED] when users have turned off the WAA feature.² The bulk of discovery, relating to Class 3, occurred after Plaintiffs filed the Third Amended Complaint, since Google failed to produce documents for most custodians until late July 2022. Based on Google's representations and the discovery that has unfolded, Plaintiffs have come to better understand the true breadth of Google's misconduct. Plaintiffs have not delayed—much less unduly—seeking to amend their Complaint in the wake of that discovery. Plaintiffs seek this amendment not in bad faith, but instead to hold Google accountable for acts that it has admitted to committing, which violate Google's promises to users. This effort is not futile. As the Court has already recognized, Google's WAA disclosures “set an expectation” amongst users that Google would not save WAA data, which includes [REDACTED] unless WAA is turned on. Dkt. 109 at 16; FAC ¶ 95 (WAA control purports to control saving of [REDACTED] Three

1 of the four *Foman* factors—delay, bad faith, and futility—are the same across all three Classes.

2 Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to [REDACTED] however, will require new discovery.

3 Google’s representations and discovery produced to date confirm that [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED] notwithstanding Google’s clear promise to save that
5 information only “[w]hen Web & App Activity is on.” FAC ¶ 95; *see* Ex. 9, GOOG-RDGZ-

6 00014556 at -58; Ex. 10, Monsees Tr. 232:1-12. Google’s witnesses have also confirmed that

7 Google uses WAA-off [REDACTED] enrich itself. [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] But to prove the extent of Google’s invasion of users’ privacy—and how much

11 Google profits from it—Plaintiffs intend to serve new, targeted discovery requests relating to [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]
13 While this amendment would both change the scope of the case and the scope of Google’s liability,
14 Plaintiffs seek to add Class 3 “in the interest of reaching a proper decision on the merits”—“the
15 very purpose of Rule 15.” *Pinterest, Inc.*, 2014 WL 1261130, at *1 (Seeborg, J.).

16 Google should not be permitted to escape liability for this misconduct simply because fully
17 investigating it will require additional discovery. That is doubly true because Google has
18 throughout this case sought to conceal from Plaintiffs the true scope of its improper saving and use
19 of WAA-off data. [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

26 [REDACTED]

27 [REDACTED]

28 [REDACTED]

Google should not be rewarded for (until recently) concealing the full scope of its improper saving and use of WAA-off data, in violation of its promises to the same group of users who already comprise Classes 1 and 2.

This action is the proper forum to litigate Google's misconduct with respect to [REDACTED]. There has already been substantial discovery on the WAA disclosures and users' failure to understand them, and the parties have been through several rounds of dispositive motions addressing those disclosures, not to mention significant discovery motions. Because all of that work might have to be repeated if this issue were litigated separately, judicial economy favors amendment. But if the Court prefers that Plaintiffs file a separate case to litigate this issue, Plaintiffs will do so.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs respectfully request leave to file their proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Mao Declaration.

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Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/Mark Mao

Mark C. Mao, CA Bar No. 236165
 Beko Reblitz-Richardson, CA Bar No. 238027
 Erika Nyborg-Burch, CA Bar No. 342125
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
 44 Montgomery St., 41st Floor
 San Francisco, CA 94104
 Tel.: (415) 293-6800
 Fax: (415) 293-6899
 mmao@bsfllp.com
 brichardson@bsfllp.com
 enyborg-burch@bsfllp.com

Alison Anderson, CA Bar No. 275334
 aanderson@bsfllp.com
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
 725 S. Figueroa Street, 31st Floor
 Los Angeles, CA 90017

1 Tel.: (213) 995-5720

2 Jesse Panuccio (admitted *pro hac vice*)
3 **BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP**
4 1401 New York Ave, NW
5 Washington, DC 20005
6 Tel.: (202) 237-2727
7 Fax: (202) 237-6131
8 jpanuccio@bsfllp.com

9 James Lee (admitted *pro hac vice*)
10 Rossana Baeza (admitted *pro hac vice*)
11 **BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP**
12 100 SE 2nd St., 28th Floor
13 Miami, FL 33131
14 Tel.: (305) 539-8400
15 Fax: (303) 539-1307
16 jlee@bsfllp.com
17 rbaeza@bsfllp.com

18 John A. Yanchunis (admitted *pro hac vice*)
19 Michael F. Ram CA Bar No. 104805
20 Ryan J. McGee (admitted *pro hac vice*)
21 Ra Amen (admitted *pro hac vice*)
22 **MORGAN & MORGAN**
23 201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
24 Tampa, FL 33602
25 Tel.: (813) 223-5505
26 jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
27 mram@forthepeople.com
28 rmcgee@forthepeople.com
ramen@forthepeople.com

Amanda K. Bonn, CA Bar No. 270891
SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
Los Angeles, CA. 90067
Tel: (310) 789-3100
Fax: (310) 789-3150
abonn@susmangodfrey.com

William S. Carmody (admitted *pro hac vice*)
Shawn Rabin (admitted *pro hac vice*)
Steven M. Shepard (admitted *pro hac vice*)
Alexander P. Frawley (admitted *pro hac vice*)
Ryan K. Sila (admitted *pro hac vice*)
SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor

1 New York, NY 10019-6023
2 Tel.: (212) 336-8330
3 Fax: (212) 336-8340
4 bcarmody@susmangodfrey.com
5 srabin@susmangodfrey.com
6 sshepard@susmangodfrey.com
7 afrawley@susmangodfrey.com
8 rsila@susmangodfrey.com

9 Ian B. Crosby (admitted *pro hac vice*)
10 Jenna G. Farleigh, CA Bar No. 288811
11 **SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.**
12 1201 Third Avenue Suite 3800
13 Seattle, WA 98101-3000
14 Tel: (206) 516-3880
15 Fax: (206) 516-3883
16 icrosby@susmangodfrey.com
17 jfarleigh@susmangodfrey.com

18 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28